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Banking Sector Reforms and the Nigerian Economy: 
Performance, Pitfalls, and Future Policy Options 
 
By 
 
E. D. Balogun*
 
This paper reviews the perspective of banking sector reforms since 1970 to date. It notes four eras of banking 
sector reforms in Nigeria, viz.: Pre-SAP (1970-85), the Post-SAP (1986-93), the Reforms Lethargy (1993-
1998), Pre-Soludo (1999-2004) and Post-Soludo (2005-2006).  Using both descriptive statistics and 
econometric methods, three sets of hypothesis were tested: firstly that each phase of reforms culminated in 
improved incentives; secondly that policy reforms which results in increased capitalization, exchange rate 
devaluation; interest rate restructuring and abolition of credit rationing may have had positive effects on real 
sector credit and thirdly that implicit incentives which accompany the reforms had salutary macroeconomic 
effects.   The empirical results confirm that eras of pursuits of market reforms were characterized by 
improved incentives.  However, these did not translate to increased credit purvey to the real sector.  Also while 
growth was stifled in eras of control, the reforms era was associated with rise in inflationary pressures.  
Among the pitfalls of reforms identified by the study are faulty premise and wrong sequencing of reforms and 
a host of conflicts emanating from adopted theoretical models for reforms and above all, frequent reversals 
and/or non-sustainability of reforms. In concluding, the study notes the need to bolster reforms through the 
deliberate adoption of policies that would ensure convergence of domestic and international rates of return on 
financial markets investments.  
1.  Introduction 
 There is a fair agreement in the literature that economic reforms, especially what came to 
be tagged structural adjustment programs (SAP),  have almost always been mounted in response 
to national financial distress whose foundation could be traced to macroeconomic distortions 
(World Bank 1986).  While such distress manifest mainly as deep economic deterioration 
(stagflation and huge external debts), distortions are often evident in the pursuit of unsustainable 
fiscal, monetary and exchange rates policies in addition to widespread government intervention 
in enterprises that can best be handled by the private sector.   In general, several analysts believe 
that economic mal-adjustment is associated with policy pursuits which depart from free market 
pricing policies (Chiber, et al 1986; Ray 1986).  Economic reforms are therefore seen as pursuits 
of fiscal reforms and market liberalizations, which focus on extensive privatization of state 
owned enterprises as well as liberalization of financial and foreign exchange markets, with the 
government limited to provision of the right enabling environment for a private sector led 
growth.    
There is a consensus in the literature that at the heart of economic reforms is the need to 
address a two-fold task: restructure or get policy incentives right as well as restructure key 
implementation institutions.   Financial sector reforms is that aspect of economic reforms which 
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focus mainly on restructuring financial sector institutions (regulators and operators) via 
institutional and policy reforms.  As part of the financial sector, banking sector reforms is that 
aspect which focuses mainly on getting incentives right for the banking sector to take the lead 
role in empowering the private sector to contribute more to economic growth.   
In Nigeria, we recognize four phases of banking sector reforms since the commencement 
of SAP.   The first is the financial systems reforms of 1986 to 1993 which led to deregulation of 
the banking industry that hitherto was dominated by indigenized banks that had over 60 per cent 
Federal and State governments’ stakes, in addition to credit, interest rate and foreign exchange 
policy reforms.   The second phase began in the late 1993-1998, with the re-introduction of 
regulations.  During this period, the banking sector suffered deep financial distress which 
necessitated another round of reforms, designed to manage the distress.   The third phase began 
with the advent of civilian democracy in 1999 which saw the return to liberalization of the 
financial sectors, accompanied with the adoption of distress resolution programmes.  This era 
also saw the introduction of universal banking which empowered the banks to operate in all 
aspect of retail banking and non-bank financial markets.  The forth phase began in 2004 to date 
and it is informed by the Nigerian monetary authorities who asserted that the financial system 
was characterized by structural and operational weaknesses and that their catalytic role in 
promoting private sector led growth could be further enhanced through a more pragmatic reform.   
Although these reforms have been acclaimed to be necessary, it is however debatable if 
they yielded the anticipated results.  The objective of this paper therefore, is to assess the relative 
effectiveness of the reforms as well as gauge the likely impact of the outcomes on economic 
performance.  Thereafter, the pitfalls which militated against the effectiveness of the reforms 
would be identified and future policy options recommended. 
2.  Theoretical Underpinnings and Measurement of Effects of 
Reforms 
The literature is replete with studies which show that the objectives of financial sector 
reforms are broadly the same in most countries of Sub-Sahara Africa.   Omoruyi (1991), CBN 
(2004) and several financial sector analysts summarized these objectives to include: market 
liberalization for the promotion of a more efficient resource allocation; expansion of savings 
mobilization base, promotion of investment and growth through market-based interest rates.  It 
also means the improvement of the regulatory and surveillance framework; fostering healthy 
competition in the provision of services and above all laying the basis for inflation control and 
economic growth.    
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There also seems to be a universal agreement within the literature that these objectives 
could be attained through deregulation of erstwhile regulated domestic money and foreign 
exchange markets, adoption of market based approach to credit allocation and the pursuit of 
sustainable fiscal and monetary policies.  It could also require the restructuring of financial 
markets via legislative changes and the active use of prudential regulations and enforcement of 
capital adequacy requirements. 
With regard to the banking sector, the literature is of the view that its reform is 
imperative if it is to “to play a key role in pricing and trading risks and implementing monetary 
and fiscal policies” as part of the process of “a shift in emphasis to a private sector led 
economy”.  It is further argued by this school of thought that reforms which foster institutional 
efficiency is imperative if the banking sector is to play the desired catalytic role in the real 
sector” (NPC 2004).  The arguments are that for efficiency, such reforms should address the 
issues which militate against the efficiency of the banking sectors such as: the “shallow depths of 
the capital market, dependence of financial sector on public sector and foreign exchange trading 
as sources of funding; apparent lack of harmony between fiscal and monetary policies and above 
all, the poor loans repayments performance as well as bad debts (Ojo 2005; Nnanna 2005).   
In terms of policy thrust therefore, the banking sector reforms is expected “to build and 
foster a competitive and healthy financial system to support development and to avoid systemic 
distress” (Soludo, 2007). It is further argued that deepening the banking sector in terms of asset 
volume and instrument diversity could lead to drastic reduction of fiscal deficit financing and 
freeing resources for lending to the private sector.  In general therefore, banking sector reforms is 
interpreted to mean embarking on a comprehensive process aimed at substantially improving the 
financial infrastructure, strengthening the regulatory and supervisory framework to address the 
issue of low capitalization and a structured financing for cheap credit to the real sector and 
financial accommodations for small and rural credit schemes.  
 There is also a fair agreement within the literature on the transmission mechanisms 
between reformed policies and macroeconomic outcomes. The traditional view in general is that 
banking sector reforms is encapsulated in institutional, monetary and exchange rates 
restructuring, and can therefore be analyzed via the study of their transmission mechanisms.  The 
main thrust of this argument is that policy actions of the monetary authorities which are 
implemented by the banking sector have as its ultimate target inflation control and growth 
stimulation.     The response of the banking sector to these policies represents in principle the 
transmission mechanisms which hold the key to the realization of these ultimate targets.   
Masson and Pattillo (2003) notes four such channels between instruments of monetary policy 
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and its ultimate targets (inflation and real output) as: (i) direct interest rate effects, which 
influence investment decisions and the choice between consuming now and consuming later; (ii) 
indirect effects via other asset prices, such as prices of bonds, equities and real estate, which will 
influence spending through balance sheet and cash flow effects; (iii) exchange rate effects, which 
will change relative prices of domestic and foreign goods, influencing net imports, and also the 
value of foreign currency denominated assets, with resulting balance sheet effects; and (iv) credit 
availability effects, which may include credit rationing if there are binding ceilings on interest 
rates .  
Method of Analysis 
In order to give an objective assessment of the outcomes of the banking sector reforms, 
there is the need to specify evaluating criteria.  Given the fact that four phases of banking sector 
reforms had been undertaken since 1986 to date, I have proposed to use descriptive statistics to 
test the hypothesis that each phase culminated into improved incentives for the provision of 
better services to the economy as whole.  The assumption is that the post reforms values of 
measures of institutional and policy response performance represents significant improvements 
over the pre-reforms value.  Among these measures are: branch networks, increased supply and 
improved access to credit, improvement in selected financial sector and distress ratios, and above 
all increased profit earnings, as well as increased ability to compete within the global economy.  
It should however be noted that several factors exist besides the reforms measures that could 
explain the trend in these indicators.   
In order to ascertain the relative efficiency of the reforms, we posit that increases in asset 
base should lead to increase in lending to the real sector at lower interest rates.  Interest rates 
reforms should lead to positive real savings rate, as well as the convergence, and/or narrowing 
down of the premium between the savings and prime lending rates.  Foreign exchange market 
reforms should correct overvaluations and foster relative stability of the exchange rate of the 
naira vis-à-vis world trading currencies, in addition to eliminating divergence inherent in the 
current multiple exchange rates system.  
 In order to assess the likely effects of these changes on economic performance, we posit 
that the emergent changes in incentives structure may have had the desired effects on real sector 
credit and performance during the period.   On this score, it is proposed here that we test two 
postulates: the first, hypothesizes that policy reforms which results in increased capitalization, 
exchange rate devaluation; interest rate restructuring and abolition of credit rationing may have 
had positive effects on real sector credit. The second, from the macroeconomic perspective, tests 
the hypothesis that implicit monetary and exchange rates incentives which accompany the 
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reforms had salutary macroeconomic effects reflected in the trends in aggregate economic 
growth and inflation.   
Model Specification 
 In its implicit form, the first model can be rendered as: 
 ( ) )1(,,,,,, LLLLL∫= BBrEXRMRRSRLRCRRCAPBRTCRPCR  
Whereby PCR = Production Sector Credit by Commercial Banks; TCR = Total Credit to the 
Economy; CAPBR = Capital and Reserves of the Banks; CRR = Cash Reserve Requirements; 
LR = Prime lending rates; SR = Savings Rate; MRR = Minimum Rediscount rates or monetary 
policy rates; EXR = Exchange rates, BBr = No. of branch networks of commercial banks.  This 
equation is proposed to be estimated using single equations systems. 
 The second hypothesis would be investigated through two sets of equations rendered as 
follows: 
 ( ) )2(,,,,2 LLLLL∫= EXRCGCPMRRMGDP   
 ( ) )3(,,,,2 LLLLL∫= EXRCGCPMRRMCPI  
Whereby GDP and CPI are defined as real Gross Domestic Product and Consumer Price Index; 
M2 = Money Supply; CP = Private Sector Credit; CG = banking sector credit to government, 
while MRR and EXR are as defined in equation (1).  Given the fact that the equations have 
common explanatory variables, and the ample evidence that the two dependent variables are 
known to granger cause each other, it is intended that a simultaneous equations model which 
includes the autoregressive and distributed lags as part of the systems of equation may be more 
appropriate to its estimation.   If we denote the matrices of the explanatory variables as X, the 
simultaneous equation form of (2) and (3) in explicit forms becomes: 
)4(2312122110 LLLLtttitttt uXXXGDPGDPGDP ++++++= −−−− αααββα  
 )5(2312122110 LLLLtttitttt uXXXCPICPICPI ++++++= −−−− αααββα  
Given the fact that the purely exogenous variables in the models are about five, equation 
4 and 5 can be rendered in more complete and general form as: 
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Whereby: the autoregressive variables are as defined earlier on, while the distributed lag 
components (Xk) can be defined as:  
• X1  = M2t; X2  = MRRt; X3 = CPt; X4 = CGt  and  X5 = EXRt  
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• X6 = M2 (t-1); X7  = MRRt-1; X8 = CPt-1; X9 = CGt-1  and  X10 = EXRt-1 
• X11  = M2(t-2); X12  = MRRt-2; X13 = CPt-2; X14 = CGt-2  and  X15 = EXRt-2  
Thus equations 6 and 7 would be estimated through a simultaneous regression estimation 
procedure.  This estimation procedure is often adjudged to yield better and more efficient 
estimates of the parameters and coefficients of the regression than the single equation models. 
Data Sources and Adjustments 
 Following our specification, the measure of real GDP is the volume index based on 2000 
= 1000, and the consumer price indices for domestic prices.  Money supply is captured by broad 
money (M2) as reported in IMF IFS and CBN monetary survey data, while the potential 
crowding out effect of domestic credit to the government is captured in the model, by the relative 
share of both the government and the private sectors in banking systems’ credit to the economy.  
This variable is expected to embody the net outcome of monetary policy pursuits via reserve 
control and/or the implicit credit allocation bias which monetary policy induces.  The bias and 
incentives created in favour of holding public debt instruments and/or recourse to rediscount 
facilities is presumed to be embodied in the treasury bills and/or minimum rediscount rates.  In 
this study, the MRR is adjudged to be a better measure of interest rate policy since it is the 
benchmark rate often determined by the monetary authorities as part of its interest rate operating 
procedures.  It is thereby adjudged to be the compass rate that steers all other interest rates, 
especially treasury bills rate and/or rates on special monetary authority’s certificates issued as 
instruments of indirect monetary control.  This rate can have significant bearing on inflation in 
the face of frequent recourse to its use, especially when the monetary authority sterilize such 
funds as part of its monetary control measure and the burden of debt service arising there from is 
not absolved by the fiscal authorities.  With regard to exchange rate variable, it is measured in 
terms of local currency per $, so as to reflect appropriately the direction of change which 
devaluations implies and its increasing effects on domestic consumer prices.   
3. Empirical Results 
 Three major outcomes of the empirical tests are discussed in this section.  The first 
presents the descriptive statistics which show the trends and interclass difference between pre- 
and post-reforms variables and its implication for banking sector incentives.  The second 
presents the results of equation (1), while the third section discusses the results of equations 6 
and 7. 
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3.1 Reforms and Banking Sector 
Institutional Strength and Investment Behaviour 
Prior to SAP, aside from indigenization which gave government 60 per cent stake in 
otherwise foreign banks that operated in the country, there was no limit to the capital base 
requirements for banks.  However, following the adoption of SAP, a limit of N1.0 billion was 
prescribed for commercial banks and about N500 million for merchant banks.  This was however 
increased subsequently to N2 billion prior to Soludo.  In Soludo’s era, the commercial banks 
were mandated to recapitalize from a minimum capital base of N2 billion to N25 billion.   As a 
corollary to asset base requirements, both prudential and monetary policy guidelines were 
prescribed for the banking sector.  In pre-SAP era, banks operated in an environment of credit 
allocation, interest rate subsidy, fixed exchange rate and foreign exchange rationing.  This 
however gave way to liberalization post-SAP era.    
An assessment of the outcome of the reforms over time is as shown in Table 1.  As can 
be deduced from the figure, post-SAP era witnessed rapid expansion in number and branches 
networks of banks, from 40 and 1323 commercial/merchant banks in 1985 to 120 and 2382 in 
1993.   During the Post-Reform lethargy era, some of the banks became distressed and were 
liquidated, reducing their number to 89 and 2220 branch networks in 1998.  Although the Soludo 
reforms consolidated the banks through mergers, acquisitions and new issues to 25 banks, their 
Period Soludo
Item 1970 1980 1985 1986 1990 1993 1994 1997 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
No. of Banks 15 26 40 41 107 120 116 115 89 89 89 89 25
No. of Bank Branches 273 752 1323 1394 2013 2382 2547 2477 2220 2306 3123 3382 4500
Total Assets Base of Banks (N'Billion) 1.2 17.3 37.0 48.1 117.4 341.7 357.5 681.7 818.4 1707.0 2766.6 3209.0 6555.0
Total Assets Base of Banks ($'Billion) 1.6 32.1 37.0 14.5 13.0 15.6 16.2 31.1 37.4 15.6 21.9 24.2 51.1
Capital and Reserves (N'Billion) 0.1 0.4 1.1 1.5 5.2 10.9 9.1 35.2 72.9 394.6 821.9 1050.0 957.0
Av. Cap. and Reserves per Bank (N'Billion) 0.0039 0.0160 0.0282 0.0364 0.0484 0.0906 0.0789 0.3058 0.8186 4.4335 9.2348 11.7978 38.2800
Liquidity Ratio1 94.5 47.6 65.0 36.4 44.3 42.2 48.5 40.2 46.8 58.0 48.8 41.5 52.9
Cash Reserve Ratios2 5.2 10.6 1.8 1.7 2.9 6.0 5.7 7.8 8.3 10.0 11.6 5.9 6.1
Loan-to-Deposit Ratio3 51.3 66.7 66.9 83.2 66.5 42.9 60.9 76.6 74.4 46.2 78.4 85.4 97.5
     Exchange rate 0.7100 0.5400 1.0000 3.3200 9.0000 21.8800 22.0000 21.8900 21.8900 109.5500 126.4000 132.3500 128.2000
1/ Liquidity ratio is the ratio of total specified liquid assets to toal current liabilities
2/ Cash reserve ratio is the ratio of cash reserve requirement to total current liabilities
3/ Loan-to-Deposit ratio is the ratio of total loans and advances to toal current liabilities
Table 1: Basic Indicators of Banking Sector Performance Pre-SAP, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th phases
Pre-SAP
Memorandum item
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Abuja
Post-SAP Reforms Lethergy Pre-Soludo
total branch networks increased to about 4500 in 2006 (Soludo 2007).    
Signs of institutional weakness were apparent through out the period under review.  In 
pre-SAP era, average asset base per bank declined from N1.2 billion in 1980 to N0.924 billion in 
1985.  Thereafter, there was apparent growth in Naira terms post-SAP era as the average was 
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above the recommended N2 billion marks.  However, following devaluations of exchange rates, 
these figures were the equivalent of US $0.122 billion in 1993 to US $0.272 billion in 2004.  
These figures tended to suggest that Nigerian banks were too weak to compete globally.  
Although a number of analyst have often argued that this outcome could be the result of assets 
undervaluation in the face of exchange rate depreciation, a number of the banks were adversely 
affected especially those saddled with external debt service burdens.  The institutional ratios 
attested to this.  In pre-SAP era, both the liquidity and cash reserve ratios deteriorated and the 
situation persisted in post-SAP era as they were quite below the prescribed minimum by the 
monetary authorities.  
With regard to credit purvey, the banking sector exhibited mixed performance.  The 
immediate post-SAP witnessed increased attention given by the banking sector to the production 
sectors.  The share of agricultural and manufacturing sectors in banking sector credit increased 
post-SAP and the production sector as a whole accounted for an annual average of 58.3 per cent 
of total to the economy (see Table 2).  However, during the era of reforms lethargy, 
miscellaneous lending crowded out production credit, to the extent that even in post-Soludo era, 
it accounted for about 70.6 per cent of total credit.     While it can be argued that post Soludo’s 
Sector Av. Ann. Total Agric Man. Mining R.E&.C. Productn Miscel. Svs/Others Total
Period N'Million % Share % Share % Share % Share % Share % Share % Share % Share
Pre-SAP 1970-79 3,952.9              2.3 12.5 0.9 8.9 24.7 1.8 73.5 100.0
Pre-SAP 1980-85 11,978.3            7.2 23.7 1.0 17.1 49.0 4.7 46.3 100.0
Post-SAP 1986-93 32,053.4            14.7 31.0 1.6 11.0 58.3 5.0 36.6 100.0
Refms Leth.1994-1998 202,177.9          13.0 34.7 8.7 0.0 54.7 34.6 10.6 100.0
Pre-Soludo 1999-2004 3,248,367.7       6.1 25.0 8.3 0.0 39.4 57.2 3.4 100.0
Soludo 2004 5,686,669.2       4.6 23.0 9.1 0.0 36.7 61.1 2.2 100.0
Post Soludo 2005 7,392,670.0       3.8 19.9 9.1 0.0 32.8 65.5 1.7 100.0
Post-Soludo 2006 9,684,397.7       3.2 16.9 8.0 0.0 28.1 70.6 1.3 100.0
Source: Computed from CBN Statistical Bulletin
Table 2: Sectoral Distribution of Commercial Banks Loans 
reforms may have helped to build and foster a competitive and healthy financial system, it is 
debatable if the structure of their portfolio investments has the capacity to support the desired 
economic development aspiration of the proponents.  This could be inferred from Table 2 which 
shows that despite the rapid increase in lending to the economy, the share of production sectors 
of the economy especially agriculture and mining remained low and indeed declined 
proportionately over time suggesting that the new monies may have been channelled into 
miscellaneous activities.   Yet agriculture is known to contribute a major share to the GDP, even 
under conditions that it is not getting new funds.  A significant proportion of the production 
loans go to manufacturing, probably to finance imports of raw materials, machineries and 
component assembly activities.   
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Exchange Rates Reforms and Incentives Structure 
 Prior to SAP (1970 to 1985), banks operated under highly regulated environment, 
characterized by fixed exchange rates structures guided by official financial markets.  In 
particular, an official foreign exchange market was operated by central bank which allocated 
foreign exchange to end users based on import licensing procedures at predetermined rates.  
Incidentally, this system led to huge unpaid trade arrears and external debts coupled with 
exchange rate overvaluation.   With the adoption of SAP, this procedure was abolished and 
replaced with a two-tier market structure.  While the official window was initially retained for 
special government transactions and debt service, the Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market, a 
Period/Era NER NEER MRR TBR DR SR LR Inflation CPI USCPI
Pre-SAP 1970-79 0.65 6709.10 4.3 n.a 3.2 4.0 6.8 15.9 0.7 30.4
Pre-SAP 1980-85 0.72 7846.26 8.0 n.a 7.2 8.3 9.4 18.0 2.2 56.2
Post-SAP 1986-93 9.70 1201.00 16.1 20.4 15.7 15.6 20.3 27.8 8.9 73.8
Refms Leth.1994-199 21.91 240.17 13.5 12.4 11.4 8.7 19.3 36.0 66.0 90.7
Pre-Soludo 1999-200 115.44 93.90 17.3 16.5 14.1 5.0 21.6 12.9 129.2 103.4
Soludo 2004 132.58 107.74 15.0 14.3 13.7 4.4 19.2 17.6 176.1 109.7
Post Soludo 2005 131.27 123.81 13.0 8.6 10.5 3.6 18.0 15.0 227.1 112.9
Post-Soludo 2006 127.46 133.03 13.7 11.2 9.6 3.1 16.8 12.8 392.0
Table 3: Average Exchange Rates, Interest Rates and Consumer Price Indices for Nigeria & US
Source: Computed from IFS, CBN and National Bureau of Statistics Data base.
Dutch-Auction System in which financial institutions bid to purchase foreign exchange at the 
market-clearing rates for their intended beneficiaries, was introduced.   This system laid the 
foundation for exchange rates devaluation and the emergence of multiple exchange rates systems 
in Nigeria.   However during the Reforms Lethargy era (1994 to 1998), which was characterized 
by adjustment fatigue with lots of policy reversals following the change in government, there 
was a return to regulation. The foreign exchange market was segmented into two: official 
window which accommodated government transactions at a special rate of $1 = N22, and the 
other window at $1 = N80.  The market segmentation laid the foundations for the gross abuse of 
the markets and which seemed to defy any practical solutions even as of today.   According to 
Ojo (2005), “…the malfunctioning of the foreign exchange market has made the various 
attempts at determining a realistic naira exchange rate prove elusive” and contributed in no small 
measure towards fuelling domestic inflation.   He also maintained that malfunction permitted 
various malpractices in the market which include: spurious purchases and disbursements without 
complete documentation, charging of excessive fees and commissions by the dealing banks; 
failure to repatriate export proceeds and non-payment of interest earned to customers that operate 
letters of credit and domiciliary accounts.    
With the advent of civilian democracy in Nigeria in 1999, there was an apparent return to 
the path of economic reforms again.  Although for the first two years of this period, the basic 
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framework for foreign exchange management continued to focus on periodic changes in the rules 
of the inter-bank foreign Exchange Market (IFEM), by July 2002, the Dutch Auction System 
(DAS) which was jettisoned in 1992 for leading to rapid exchange rate devaluation was re-
introduced.  The DAS has remained in operation up till today, even in the Soludo era.   
In terms of incentives structure, Table 3 shows that the Naira was highly over valued in 
pre-SAP era, while rapid depreciation in post SAP era narrowed the gap between the nominal 
and real effective exchange rates with an equilibrium attained in pre-Soludo era.  Subsequently, 
continuous depreciation resulted in undervaluation of the Naira that was only corrected in 
Soludo’s era.  Many economic analysts believed that DAS has resulted in a nebulous exchange 
rates structure and has fostered abuses.  Ojo (2005)  supports the view that DAS is at the root 
cause of the problem of continuous depreciation and multiplicity of exchange rates within the 
economy, which hitherto, resulted in the entrenched speculation and arbitrage by the banking 
sector.  Among the malpractices which he identified are: “spurious bidding by authorized dealers 
in line with their penchant to channel almost all resources to foreign exchange bidding to 
guarantee successful bids.  This will, in turn, lead to a drying up of loanable funds and 
consequent return to higher and rising interest rates”.    
Monetary Control Techniques and Interest Rates Structure 
Prior to SAP and immediate post SAP, monetary management relied on direct controls of 
reserves and interest rates structure of banks.  However, in 1993, an important reform of the 
monetary management strategies was the introduction of open market operations (OMO).  OMO 
became the dominant instrument of liquidity management complimented by reserve 
requirements and discount window operations.  Unfortunately, the new approach was yet to find 
its footing when macroeconomic management returned to an era of regulation by 1994-1998.  
Irrespective of the market fundamentals, the monetary authorities pegged minimum rediscount 
rates at 13.5 per cent, as well as specified interest rates limits to not more than 21 percent for 
lending rates, while the spread between savings and lending rates was expected not be more than 
7.5 per cent.   
As it turned, the introduction of OMO followed by a return to interest rates control 
opened up another investment portfolio to the commercial banks.  This manifested mainly in the 
new opportunity offered the savings public to diversify their portfolio investments from 
traditional savings and the stock markets into money markets.  The banks were also offered the 
opportunity to diversify from traditional credit purveys, and foreign exchange markets 
transactions to trading in money market instruments especially treasury bills and repos 
transactions at the OMO.  Table 3 shows that the yield rates on OMO and treasury bills 
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transactions were comparatively more attractive than savings rate, while the alternative 
investment portfolio which would require borrowing to meet working capital requirement were 
priced out of the profitability threshold of the investing public.  While low savings rate 
encouraged holders of idle cash balances to invest in money market instruments, it also 
encouraged financial institutions to shy away from the more risky lending portfolio and its 
associated high transactions costs to the relatively safe portfolio with little or no costs, with the 
guarantee of very good returns.   
In the face of credit apathy, financial sector operators found investment in foreign 
exchange and public debts instruments especially treasury bills very lucrative as the returns on 
them moved in tandem with the MRR.  Thus, the policy created a dilemma in the form of trade-
off costs reflected in the arbitrage gains for speculators in the financial markets.  Ironically,  
rather than serve as a penalty rate for borrowing from the central bank, the attractive treasury 
bills rate which followed the rise in MRR, saw the central bank borrowing from the banks and 
the public as part of its monetary control functions.  Such funds were sterilized but which upon 
maturity the central bank was duty bound to pay the interest rates accrual, probably via the 
creation of high powered money with adverse implications for inflationary control.  One may 
argue that if the CBN issued the debt instruments in favour of the government that the burden of 
debt service should be borne by it.  Unfortunately, during this period, fiscal authorities were 
known to resort to ways and means advances far above the permissible limits, and which were 
usually written off at the end of the day.   
The changes in the structure of treasury bills holdings attested to this.  Prior to the 
commencement of SAP, CBN accounted for a significant proportion of the treasury bills 
outstanding.  However, with the sharp rise in treasury bills rate, the situation changed, with the 
deposit money banks and the public now accounting for the major share. The shift in investment 
portfolio of the banks to this segment of the markets is quite rational.  Indeed, the banks ceased 
the opportunity of the permissive financial operating environment to mobilize funds cheap, and 
invest in relatively secure instruments.    
Also, their liability structure attested to this.  The main sources of fund are demand 
deposits, time, savings and foreign deposits, central government deposits reserve accounts and 
unclassified liabilities.  While the costs of funds from demand deposits, reserve accounts, and 
central government deposits is known to be very low, that of savings deposits have been seen to 
also be low in recent time.  Indeed, less than 30 per cent of their funds are mobilized from the 
more expensive sources.  The point to be made is that a significant proportion of their investible 
funds are sourced cheap, but are channelled into secure portfolios (money market instruments).   
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One is not surprised that since 1999 that the financial institutions that survived the distress 
emerged to become very sound and have had outstanding record of profitability, derived mainly 
from the defective interest rate structures.  
3.2  Effects of Reforms on Real Sector Credit 
The regression results of equation (1) are as shown in Table 4.  The econometric property 
of the estimated equation for each reform era is remarkable, as the overall goodness of fit is high, 
while the coefficient of the explanatory variables displayed the right signs.  The analysis show 
that increases in capital and reserves (CAPBR) which had significant positive effects on credit to 
the production sector in pre-SAP era became insignificant in post-SAP era, and indeed exhibited 
an inverse relationship since the reforms lethargy era to date.  With regard to interest rates 
structure, savings rate which hitherto had insignificant influence in pre- and post-SAP era, 
exhibited a negative but significant effects to lending to production sector during the Reforms 
Lethargy era.  It is quite interesting to note also that MRR (a monetary policy rate) exhibited a 
significant inverse relationship with the dependent variable, suggesting that erstwhile interest 
rates policy penalize lending to the productive sectors.  Also, eras of fixed exchange rates 
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
C -10.910 -17.26 -3.060 -5.24 78.544 3.87 4.076 5.67
LOG(CAPBR) 0.226 6.39 0.010 1.13 -0.939 -2.10 -0.140 -2.00
LOG(SR) 0.112 0.86 0.068 1.90 -0.785 -1.99 0.293 3.22
LOG(MRR) -0.557 -4.95 -0.053 -2.79 -1.252 -3.97 -0.063 -0.64
LOG(LR(-2)) -0.370 -2.93 -0.033 -1.43 0.430 1.65 0.170 0.92
LOG(EXR) -1.201 -11.02 0.009 0.96 -4.571 -2.58 -0.374 -1.19
LOG(BBR) 1.448 9.72 0.328 3.41 -5.689 -3.10 -0.228 -2.62
LOG(CRR) -0.108 -2.65 -0.027 -1.23 -3.019 -2.36 -0.165 -2.14
R-squared 0.992 0.971 0.826 0.969
Adjusted R-squared 0.991 0.962 0.750 0.960
S.E. of regression 0.071 0.010 0.142 0.035
Sum squared resid 0.264 0.002 0.322 0.030
Log likelihood 79.494 96.016 17.690 66.142
Durbin-Watson stat 1.281 0.775 1.304 1.413
    Mean dependent var -1.397 -0.563 -0.483 -0.934
    S.D. dependent var 0.745 0.053 0.283 0.177
    Akaike info criterion -2.344 -6.070 -0.807 -3.634
    Schwarz criterion -2.067 -5.693 -0.415 -3.267
    F-statistic 948.641 101.218 10.831 107.512
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 4: Regression Results of the Effects of Reforms on Real Sector CreditI
Log(PCR/TCR) Log(PCR/TCR) Log(PCR/TCR) Log(PCR/TCR)
Pre-SAP Post-SAP Pre/Post SoludoReforms Lethargy
Period  (1993-98)  (1999-2006)(1986-93)(1970-85)
policies especially pre-SAP and Reforms Lethargy displayed negative and significant effects on 
the dependent variable confirming our a priori expectation that overvaluation penalizes lending 
to the productive sectors.  Also, the growth in network of bank branches which hitherto 
positively influence credit purvey in pre- and post-SAP era, had negative effect on production 
credit during the era of reforms lethargy and had remained so in pre- and post-Soludo’s era.  
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Finally, the coefficient of the CRR variable confirm the assertion that reserve operating 
procedures limits the credit creating ability of the banks.  
3.2 Policy Reforms and Economic Performance 
Table 5 and 5a presents the Log linear and the linear regression results estimated with 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) methods of the simultaneous equations model made up of 
a system of equations (6) and (7).  For the purpose of this study, let us examine the effects of the 
purely exogenous variables on the dependent variables.  The result shows that in pre-SAP era, 
monetary and exchange rates policies were relatively ineffective.  While MRR had an inverse 
influence on the GDP variable, credit expansion to government represented the main source of 
Period
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Log(GDP(-1)) 1.5780 17.41 -0.1102 -0.42 1.7327 16.28 2.8122 1.64
Log(GDP(-2)) -0.6669 -7.12 0.1281 0.47 -0.7164 -7.04 -2.9703 -1.81
log(CPI(-1)) -0.0758 -1.87 1.1571 9.78 0.0231 2.20 1.1614 6.87
log(CPI(-2)) 0.0772 1.94 -0.3807 -3.28 -0.0156 -1.07 -0.6004 -2.55
C 0.3165 2.59 -1.1020 -3.10 0.0315 0.28 -2.0819 -1.15
Log(M2) -0.0026 -0.29 0.0359 1.37 -0.0096 -1.11 0.2925 2.10
Log(CG) 0.0047 0.69 0.0447 2.26 -0.0007 -0.34 -0.0001 0.00
Log(CP) 0.0113 0.80 0.0521 1.26 -0.0024 -0.50 -0.0123 -0.16
Log(MRR) -0.0344 -2.24 0.0225 0.50 0.0074 1.10 0.1589 1.45
log(EXR) 0.0002 0.01 0.0957 1.43 0.0001 0.06 0.0577 1.63
Observations: 62 Observations: 62 Observations: 29 Observations: 29
R-squared 0.9979 0.9979 0.9995 0.9941
Adjusted R-squared 0.9976 0.9976 0.9993 0.9912
S.E. of regression 0.0354 0.0354 0.0035 0.0568
Durbin-Watson stat 2.0445 2.0445 2.1297 1.7884
    Mean dependent var 3.9813 0.0004 4.2461 2.0573
    S.D. dependent var 0.1425 0.7186 0.1332 0.6064
    Sum squared resid 0.0077 0.0650 0.0002 0.0612
Period
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Log(GDP(-1)) 1.1002 7.33 -2.0358 -0.29 1.1999 7.40 -1.2371 -0.51
Log(GDP(-2)) -0.1287 -0.86 -0.6193 -0.09 -0.3084 -2.02 2.5754 1.13
log(CPI(-1)) 0.0002 0.04 1.0985 5.53 -0.0007 -0.08 1.3986 11.10
log(CPI(-2)) 0.0088 2.01 -0.3662 -1.76 0.0105 1.09 -0.6147 -4.26
C 0.1065 1.42 5.5541 1.56 0.2845 2.25 -3.7370 -1.97
Log(M2) -0.0151 -2.37 0.3717 1.24 -0.0111 -2.19 0.1891 2.49
Log(CG) 0.0017 2.55 -0.0162 -0.51 0.0021 1.23 -0.0244 -0.97
Log(CP) 0.0059 1.73 0.2167 1.34 0.0244 2.82 -0.1264 -0.98
Log(MRR) 0.0068 3.58 -0.0044 -0.05 -0.0066 -1.60 0.0023 0.04
log(EXR) 0.0240 2.43 0.0677 0.15 -0.0004 -0.05 -0.4326 -3.25
Observations: 24 Observations: 24 Observations: 32 Observations: 32
R-squared 0.9997 0.9955 0.9998 0.9972
Adjusted R-squared 0.9995 0.9926 0.9997 0.9960
S.E. of regression 0.0010 0.0471 0.0019 0.0285
Durbin-Watson stat 2.2216 1.8258 2.1995 2.2558
    Mean dependent var 4.4631 3.9466 4.7045 5.0487
    S.D. dependent var 0.0469 0.5460 0.1090 0.4536
    Sum squared resid 0.00001 0.0311 0.0001 0.0179
Reforms Lethargy (1993-98)
Log(GDP) Log(CPI
Pre/Post Soludo (1999-2006)
Log(GDP) Log(CPI
Table 5: Simultaneous Equation Model of Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies on GDP and CPI
Log(GDP) Log(CPI
Pre-SAP (1970-85) Post-SAP (1986-93)
Log(GDP) Log(CPI
inflationary pressures.   During the immediate post-SAP era, monetary and exchange rates policy 
were largely ineffective in influencing growth and inflationary control as almost all the 
parameter estimates were not significant.   While expansionary money supply hurts real domestic 
output (GDP), it contributed to fuelling inflationary pressure as the parameter estimate is 
significant in the CPI dependent structural equation during the period.  Exchange rate variable 
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also had significant influence on CPI at 5 per cent level (see Table 5) and indeed, the 
onlysignificant variable in Table 5a, suggesting that devaluation resulted solely to fuelling 
inflation in this period.   
 The regression result for the Reforms Lethargy era (1993-1998) is most interesting.  All 
the coefficients of the explanatory variables for the GDP dependent structural equation were 
significant.  In particular, expansionary money supply had negative effects on GDP, while the 
pursuit of fixed interest and exchange rates policies reflected in MRR and EXR variables had 
Period
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
GDP(-1) 1.523373 18.03347 1.761436 15.667
GDP(-2) -0.573244 -6.887858 0.002301 4.906553 -0.762661 -6.747812
CPI(-1) -2.89707 -2.634146 1.187175 12.64045 0.861691 18.35415
CPI(-2) 3.922911 3.59154 -0.510676 -5.347885
C 3.407464 2.90932 0.256137 0.578821
M2 0.000376 2.723148 -2.65E-05 -3.093142
M2(-1) -0.000424 -3.019453
M2(-2) 4.87E-05 5.023733
CG 8.44E-05 6.557099
CG(-2) -4.06E-05 -2.739669
EXR(-1) 0.196384 4.887192
Observations: 62 Observations: 62 Observations: 32 Observations: 32
R-squared 0.994112 0.997424 0.998719 0.99108
Adjusted R-squared 0.993348 0.997143 0.998631 0.990783
S.E. of regression 0.577618 0.04842 0.337856 0.544109
Durbin-Watson stat 2.056624 1.917743 1.569237 1.420242
    Mean dependent var 54.09516 1.280323 69.56562 8.9175
    S.D. dependent var 7.082382 0.905899 9.129944 5.667397
    Sum squared resid 18.01667 0.12895 3.310247 8.88163
Period
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
GDP(-1) 1.799487 11.27409 1.48634 9.423953
GDP(-2) -0.798816 -4.848971 -0.464305 -2.828789 0.219137 3.448919
CPI(-1) 0.932006 33.71996 1.65892 15.39912
CPI(-2) -0.801648 -6.535764
C 0.054143 0.070043 -1.693158 -2.745009
CG(-2) 5.17E-05 6.243019
EXR(-1) 0.346884 4.158179 -0.168481 -3.160866
Observations: 20 Observations: 32
R-squared 0.998853 0.98265 0.99969 0.997974
Adjusted R-squared 0.998718 0.981686 0.999669 0.997674
S.E. of regression 0.133767 2.773107 0.223624 4.612951
Durbin-Watson stat 1.784612 1.603668 1.958547 1.936863
    Mean dependent var 87.845 65.9915 111.0875 174.2816
    S.D. dependent var 3.736234 20.49173 12.28883 95.64048
    Sum squared resid 0.30419 138.4222 1.450229 574.5415
aLinear model estimated using seemingly unrelated regression methods after eliminating insignificant variables
Reforms Lethargy (1993-98) Pre/Post Soludo (1999-2006)
GDP CPI GDP CPI
Table 5a: Simultaneous Equation Model of Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies on GDP and CPI
Pre-SAP (1970-85) Post-SAP (1986-93)
GDP CPI GDP CPI
positive effects.  Ironically, these policy variables had no significant effect on the consumer price 
index during the period.  Indeed, the deliberate maintenance of fixed interest rates and the return 
to credit allocations during this period with the result that more credit went to the production 
sector could explain the positive effects on GDP.  The result of the exchange rate variable also 
confirms the a priori expectation that stabilization of exchange rates in a country whose 
production base is foreign dependent augurs well for that economy.  This is particularly true for 
Nigeria during this period, as she depended to a large extent on imports for capital goods, raw 
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materials and final consumer products to augment the inadequate production and domestic 
supplies.  The return to reforms in pre/post Soludo’s era changed the economic incentives 
structure.  The GDP dependent equation show that while monetary expansion led to its 
contraction, it resulted in significant increases in consumer prices.  Banking sector credit to the 
private sector had significant positive effect on GDP while that to the government sector had 
adverse effects on it.  However, in line with theoretical expectation, credit to government 
variable had positive and significant effect on consumer prices, confirming the traditional view 
that it is inflationary.  A salutary development in this era is that exchange rates policy had 
moderating effect on inflationary pressures.   
4. Pitfalls of the Eras of Reforms 
 The review of the incentives structure and impact of reforms so far show that the outcome 
fell short of expectations and that this was doomed to be so because of some pitfalls which militated 
against it.  Among these are faulty premise for reforms, wrong sequencing of reforms, conflicts 
emanating from adopted theoretical models for reforms and above all, frequent reversals and/or 
non-sustainability of reforms.   
Faulty Premise and Inappropriate Sequencing of Reforms 
 The review of eras of reforms in Nigeria shows that the premise was to get price incentives 
right for the banking sector through the abolition of foreign exchange and credit rationing in 
favour of liberalized domestic money and foreign exchange markets.   The concern was more 
with reducing government intervention with the hope that there exists a virile private sector to 
fill the gap effectively.   Unfortunately, the Nigerian financial markets was far from being virile, 
as it was characterised by dualistic financial markets, whereby the commercial banks operated 
side by side with rural, curb and parallel markets.  While the government succeeded, albeit after 
a long period, of divesting her interests in the banking sector, market segmentations persisted 
and perhaps remain at the root of policy compromises which tended to thwart the reforms efforts 
till date.  Thus, one of the pitfalls of the reforms programme therefore is the premise that there 
exist virile private sectors that can successfully implement the reforms agenda.   
 Related to the above is the poor sequencing and coordination between policy reforms 
initiatives, the timing of implementations and sustainability.   This was particularly problematic 
in post-SAP era when the monetary authorities have had to subject the banking sector to liquidity 
shocks via discretionary monetary policy in order to tame the foreign exchange market. Nnanna 
(2005)  is of the view that such shocks was detrimental to the performance of the banking sector 
and further exposed them to increased risks in the face of macroeconomic instability, arising 
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from the weakening oil market, exchange rate and financial sector crises.  According to him, one 
such shock during this period occurred in 1988 when the monetary authority decided that the 
back-log of naira deposits for foreign exchange applications yet to be approved be moved from 
deposit money banks (DMBs) to the CBN.  The second shock stemmed from the order that 
public sector funds in DMBs be transferred to the CBN.  These combined actions precipitated 
the liquidity crisis in the period and subsequent large scale withdrawal of deposits from the 
financial system.  Although, distress resolution measures were taken by the CBN through 
accommodating some of the banks as a lender of last resort, very few regained viability, while 
many of them had their licenses revoked and were subsequently liquidated. 
Conflict Emanating from Adopted Theoretical Model for Reforms 
 This was a common pitfall that characterizes the four models of reforms implemented in 
Nigeria so far, viz.: institutional and capital base reforms, adoption of the DAS market approach, 
model of monetary control and interest rates reforms. 
With regard to institutional reforms, the assumption is that banking sector liberalization 
accompanied by increased capital base requirements is a necessary condition for improved 
performance of the banking sector.   This was echoed by the proponents of the initial banking 
sector reforms in SAP era and re-echoed by the pre/post Soludo era.  The underlying argument 
draws its strength from the neo-classical supply-side economics, rooted in Say’s Law that 
“supply creates its own demand” (Jhinghan, 2003).  That is, increased capital base may imply 
increased availability of loanable funds.  This should lead to a fall in interest rate and should be 
capable of stimulating or eliciting a demand following response as envisaged by Say’s Law of 
Markets.   However, the major pitfalls of this assumption is reflected in the trade-offs costs 
which manifested in the various eras of reforms in Nigeria.  In particular, the post-Soludo reform 
era, which is believed to have drawn into the banking sector a significant proportion of currency 
outside banks and new monies from both the domestic and international money markets (with 
the result that there was a remarkable increase in the capital and reserves of banks), did not result 
in increased credit purvey to the productive sector.  Contrary to the expectation that this should 
enhance the ability of banks to create credit, systemic leakages resulted in banks investing their 
funds on alternative and secure portfolios, in addition to exhibiting detrimental credit apathy.  
The second major pitfalls emanates from the wrong perceptions by the monetary 
authorities especially in Soludo’s era that reforms via increased capitalization and financial 
strength can foster economic growth.  This posture departs from earlier classical stance to agree 
with the Keynesians that cheap money policy which leads to lower interest rates and increased 
investment, could lead to increases in income, output and employment.   However, an important 
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qualification to this assumption in Keynesian analysis is that this is feasible when the economy is 
known to operate below the full employment level.  However, conflicts arise when the economy 
operates beyond full employment level, as has often been claimed by the monetary authorities 
who frequently resort to liquidity mop-up as part of monetary control measures.  The adoption of 
a Keynesian monetary policy stance which shifts the equilibrium money supply towards 
intersecting with the demand for money curve at the precautionary and speculative level could 
generate this type of conflict.  And indeed, with the advent of universal banking in Nigeria since 
the pre- and post-Soludo era, the demand for the new funds, is guided by the precautions that 
meeting the demand of real sector credit is risky; short term trade financing, especially imports 
yields quick returns, while opportunities to invest in bonds and treasury bills and other money 
market instruments offer a lucrative returns.  There is therefore very slim chance that the new 
money would find its way into investment, given the general level of credit apathy on the part of 
financial markets, and it is therefore an illusion that being ‘big’ and ‘strong’ connotes 
‘tremendous increase’ in credit creation ability and by inference, rapid growth.   
The third conflict revolves around the apparent inability of the monetary authority to 
monitor and supervise the conduct of the emerging few but strong ‘oligopolies’ in the domestic 
money and foreign exchange markets.  One argument often advanced for liquidity mop up by the 
monetary authorities is the need to keep a tab on monetary expansion as an instrument to 
stabilize the foreign exchange market.  The operating procedure usually is to limit the capacity of 
banks to make outrageous bids for foreign exchange, through the control of their money 
reserves.  This task was arduous when the banks were many and have a lower capital base.  
However, let us for once imagine the monster the monetary authority would have to contend 
with given the fewer but richer number of banks equipped to manipulate the foreign exchange 
market to their advantage.   The foreign exchange market would remain their niche and the 
likelihood is there that they may become sharper and wiser in that market than in other 
investment portfolios markets.   If anything, the recapitalization has strengthened them further to 
accentuate their rent seeking behavior, and domestic monetary policy appears inadequate to 
address this problem. 
A conflict that is peculiar to the Soludo reforms is the monetary authority’s stance that 
the inability to recapitalize, and/or forged a merger and acquisition relationships with others 
implies institutional weakness and which led to the liquidation of such banks. This is in spite of 
the fact that the NEEDS’ (2004) document which laid the foundations for this era of banking 
sector reforms admitted “….. that despite high profit levels, the sector does not appear to be 
playing a catalytic role in the real sector”.  It means that some of these banks were profitable 
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ventures, but had failed to play the envisaged catalytic role in the real sector. The pertinent 
question is: can small not be beautiful?  If at the level of their capitalization they were doing 
good business, why should they be liquidated on the ground that they needed to be big to make 
‘bigger profits’?  Here lies the contradiction in policy.  The financial distress experienced by this 
group of banks is policy induced as some of them were actually not distressed in the true sense 
of that word.   Ironically, one of the elements of the financial sector reforms is the promotion of 
small holder and development finance institutions expected to grant concessionary loans to small 
holder enterprises.  Indeed, the monetary authorities agree that small is beautiful, but prefers to 
kill the ‘small’ for the ‘big’.  
Conflicts Emanating from Foreign Exchange Market Segmentation 
 The review so far shows that a major element of the banking sector reforms is the 
introduction of a foreign exchange market that metamorphosed from SFEM to FEM and IFEM.  
However, the major hallmark of the markets is the adoption of DAS for the allocation and 
pricing of foreign exchange.    The Nigerian DAS is a wholesale market dominated by the CBN 
as a monopoly supplier while the financial institutions are a buying cartel purportedly on behalf 
of their clients. These banks however retail foreign exchange to individuals and corporations 
through a second window the inter bank foreign exchange market (IFEM) which operates more 
like a spot market.  In addition to these markets there is the bureau de change that sells foreign 
exchange to meet the needs for travels and personal allowances. Thus, in practice, the Nigerian 
foreign exchange market is segmented into: DAS, the wholesale segment which is monopolistic 
in supply and oligopolistic in demand, and the second: inter bank, which is olipolistic in supply 
to ultimate users of foreign exchange, complemented by bureau de change operations and 
parallel markets.    
The major dilemma or conflict arising from the segmentation of the spot market is the 
tendency of participating financial institutions in the DAS to convert purchases from the 
wholesale market to speculative operations at the inter bank market as well as in their retailing 
activities to individuals and corporations for arbitrage gains.  This was the main source of 
multiple exchange rates, widened divergence between parallel and official exchange rates and 
indeed the continuous depreciation in post reforms and pre-Soludo eras.  Although the monetary 
authority has often thought that what is needed to rectify this anomaly is increased funding of the 
wholesale market through very frequent interventions, the problem had persisted, with the result 
that rent-seeking behaviour assumed a more complex dimension.  This has further dimmed the 
prospect for exchange rates convergence, especially so as the monetary authorities is content 
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with periodic interventions through DAS for the purposes of monetization of foreign exchange 
reserves in favour of the fiscal authorities.   
Conflicts or Trade-offs in Fostering Internal and External Balance via the 
Monetary Approach 
 A common trend in all the eras of reforms is the adoption of a monetary approach for the 
attainment of internal and external balance.   The monetary approach can be expressed in the 
form of the following relationship between the demand for and supply of money (Jhinghan 
2003): 
 )1(),,(∫= LLLLLiPYM D  
  )2(LLLLLNFRNDCMS +=
   )3(LLLLLSD MM =
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Whereby MD is the demand for money which is a stable function of income (Y), prices (P) and 
rate of interest (i); MS is the money supply, which is a multiple of monetary base (m) and 
consists of net domestic money (credit) (NDC) and country’s foreign reserves (NFR).  A balance 
of payment deficit or surplus is represented by changes in the country’s reserves such that: 
 )5(KLLLNDCMNFR D Δ−Δ=Δ   
Or  )6(LLKLLLBOPNFR =Δ
Equating equations 5 and 6, then: )7(LLKLLLNDCMBOP D Δ−Δ=  
Where BOP is the balance of payment and it is equal to the change in demand for money less the 
change in domestic credit.  From equation (5) and (7), a balance of payment deficit means a 
negative BOP which reduces the NFR and the money supply.  On the other hand, a surplus 
means a positive BOP which increases the NFR and the money supply.  When BOP = 0, it means 
BOP equilibrium or no disequilibrium of BOP.   
 The adoption of this model in eras of balance of payment deficit was appropriate.  
However, in pre- and post-Soludo era, we were faced with a situation of a BOP surplus, which 
therefore suggests that expansion in money supply would have its origin from equation (4), such 
that: 
  . [ ] )4(LQL NFRNDCMS +=
This can be interpreted to mean that, although domestic money supply may exceed the demand 
for money, the excess money is not from domestic borrowing but from draw-down on reserves.  
Although the potential of such funds to swell the reserves of deposit money banks exist, it may 
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not be inflationary given the credit apathy exhibited during this era.  It could at best amount to 
‘insipid liquidity’ at the disposal of these banks for other investments portfolios.  The ability of 
such funds to compromise monetary policy pursuits is therefore limited and should not be of any 
primary concern to the monetary authority.  However, experiences show that during the pre/post 
Soludo era, the monetary authority chose to mop up this liquidity through instruments of indirect 
monetary controls.  In the face of dearth of instruments, since fiscal authorities were not 
borrowing from the public, the monetary authority has had to create its instruments to mop it up.  
Although it is often argued that it is a desirable pre-emptive action, such a precautionary reaction 
may in fact be the root cause of inflation of a monetary origin, as she had had to service the 
associated debt obligations upon maturity through fiat money creation.  The contradiction of this 
approach is that the monetary authority has chosen to stab itself in the foot by helping the fiscal 
authorities to monetize reserves which it has to periodically struggle to control, even when such 
money is not a threat to rapid monetary expansion via domestic credit creation.   
Ambivalent Theoretical Underpinning of Reforms 
 From the analysis so far, it could be inferred that during the SAP era, a monetary 
approach rooted in a monetarist stance held sway as the foundation for banking sector reforms.  
The focus was to strike a balance between internal and external balance through a combination 
of exchange rates adjustments and the use of both reserves and interest rates operating 
procedures, with the sole objective of inflationary controls.  However, as the pains of 
adjustments became severe, a Keynesian perspective was introduced as an attempt to use 
monetary policy to stimulate growth.  However, the return to credit allocation, interest and 
exchange rates control despite supply shortages brought to the fore the short comings of 
Keynesian approach.  There was an apparent return to a monetarist model in pre-Soludo era for 
fostering macroeconomic balance but with general believe that this time around it could yield a 
Keynesian result fostering development as well as taming inflation.  The post-Soludo reforms 
represents a marked departure of erstwhile theoretic model of reforms.  In thoughts, the Soludo’s 
approach to reforms is Classical with deep foundations in Say’s Law that supply creates its own 
demand.  However, it is obvious that he adopts the Monetarist view for fostering internal and 
external macroeconomic balance as it often resorted to liquidity mop up as the major instruments 
for monetary and inflationary control.  Experience during the period showed that rather than 
tame inflation, it seems to be the driving force behind domestic inflation of monetary origin.  
However, to the extent that post-Soludo reforms favoured interventions both in the foreign and 
domestic money markets, the monetary authority acted Keynesian, believing that the unseen 
hand of the state is capable of moving the economy in the desired direction.  Perhaps, it is this 
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ambivalence that is the root cause of the conflicts and tradeoffs which the Soludo’s reforms 
elicited.  . 
5. Future Policy Options and Concluding Remarks 
Going by our analysis so far, the choice for future policy options for banking sector 
reforms would be to bolster and move the Soludo’s reforms towards a clearly neo-classical 
supply side economics beyond the ambivalence of Say’s classical and Keynesian monetary 
stance.  This choice is imperative if we are to reconcile monetary and fiscal policies for the 
purpose of attaining the twin objectives of growth and inflationary controls.  Such reconciliation 
would mean that the monetary authority should be less concern with expansionary fiscal stance, 
for as long as its origin is not through domestic borrowing. Under such a scenario, it should rely 
mostly on interest rate operating procedures for macroeconomic management with the sole 
objective of moving towards the ‘law of one market’ in both the domestic and international 
money markets.  The overriding objectives would be to minimize interest and exchange rates 
risks that can adversely affect the rate of return on domestic and international financial 
investments in the country.   That way, the right incentives would be created for the inflow of 
foreign and domestic investment into the country.  This requires the urgent need to fine-tune the 
Soludo’s banking sector reforms through the deliberate adoption of policies that would ensure 
convergence of domestic and international rates of return on financial markets investment.  This 
would require getting prices right in all the markets. 
Getting Domestic Interest Rates Right 
On the domestic scene, there is the need to narrow the gap in interest rates structures of 
alternative financial markets investment portfolios.  In particular, there is the critical need to 
determine the appropriate benchmark for interest rates policies.  Although the newly introduced 
monetary policy rate is targeted at this, the extent of adjustment is inadequate.  A situation 
whereby the interest rate premium between the MPR and the Savings Rate is so wide suggest 
that arbitrage activities informed by this development would continue to issue distorted signals 
for the viability of credit portfolios and real sector investments on the one hand, and alternative 
investments in securities and money market instruments on the other hand.   Although a market 
based supply side policies was expected to attain this, the monetary authority would need to be 
less concern with the perceived adverse trade off implicit in their current approach.  Indeed 
contemporary experiences of similar economies lend support to this approach.    Thus, countries 
with best practices like the United States, United Kingdom keep their monetary policy rates close 
to their deposit rates especially savings rate.  Also countries within Africa which belong to a 
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monetary zone maintained the same tradition as it is evident from the data on Senegal and South 
Africa.  However, Botswana and Nigeria are classic examples of undesirable interest rates 
structures, induced by the failure of the monetary authorities to prescribe an appropriate 
reference rate in line with best practices (see Table 7).  
DESCRIPTSAVINGS DBOB LENDDISCOUNTDEPOSIT RDEPOSIT RDISCOUNTDISCOUNTFEDERAL 3-MONTH TBR MRR/MPR 3-M DR Sav. Rate
2004Q1 7.8 14.3 4.0 3.5 6.7 8.0 2.0 1.0 4.2 4.0 15.0 15.6 4.4
2004Q2 7.6 14.3 4.0 3.5 6.9 8.0 2.0 1.0 4.6 4.4 15.0 13.1 4.4
2004Q3 7.6 14.3 4.0 3.5 6.5 7.5 2.6 1.4 4.9 4.7 15.0 13.2 4.4
2004Q4 7.7 14.3 4.0 3.5 6.0 7.5 3.2 2.0 4.9 4.7 15.0 13.0 4.4
2005Q1 8.5 14.3 4.0 3.5 6.1 7.5 3.6 2.5 4.9 4.7 13.0 12.4 4.0
2005Q2 8.4 14.0 4.0 3.5 6.0 7.0 4.0 2.9 4.9 4.7 13.0 11.4 3.3
2005Q3 8.1 14.3 4.0 3.5 5.9 7.0 4.6 3.5 4.6 4.4 13.0 9.4 3.7
2005Q4 7.2 14.5 4.0 3.5 6.2 7.0 5.2 4.0 4.6 4.4 13.0 8.9 3.3
2006Q1 6.7 15.0 4.0 3.5 6.6 7.0 5.5 4.5 4.6 4.4 13.0 9.3 3.0
2006Q2 6.6 15.0 4.0 3.5 6.6 7.5 6.0 4.9 4.7 4.5 14.0 9.8 3.5
2006Q3 6.2 15.0 4.3 3.5 7.3 8.0 6.3 5.3 4.9 4.7 14.0 9.7 2.9
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics
Nigeria
Table 7: Interest rates Structure in Selected Countries 2004-2006
Botswana Senegal South Africa United KingdomUnited States
 
Getting External Investment Opportunities Right 
On the international scene, it is critical to foster the emergence of a rate of return on 
foreign investments especially in the Euro-Dollar markets based on real changes in financial 
assets in question and not gains from nominal exchange rates adjustments. Luckily enough, the 
stabilization of exchange rates so far is a good omen, but the monetary authority should also 
compliment this with the adjustment of domestic interest rates to coincide with Euro Dollar 
interest rates so as to put paid to this speculations arising there from.   This would require actions 
not only to synthesize the segmented domestic foreign exchange market, but also to ensure 
synergy between the foreign exchange market and the domestic money market.  One way to 
achieve this will be to look at the market fundamental of the Nigerian foreign exchange market, 
especially the DAS vis-à-vis the inter bank, with a view to permanently merging the two 
markets.   
Although it has often been argued the wholesale DAS is inevitable and that it is doubtful 
if the supply base can be broadened such that central banks intervention is eliminated while the 
perfect competitive outlook of the spot market is improved.  In my view this is feasible if the 
central bank concede their role as major supplier to the commercial banks.  This can be done via 
fiscal reforms which would enable all the tiers of government to negotiate their realized foreign 
exchange through spot market operators instead of the wholesale market. By this act, the 
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wholesale auction market would be eliminated and the window for speculation and arbitrage 
permanently foreclosed.   It also means a conscious move towards the law of one market.  In 
particular, this should mean that domestic interest rate should converge with the Eurodollar 
market rates.  That way speculations based on inter-country differences will be eliminated. 
Concluding Remarks 
 Overall, the major challenge to the Nigerian financial sector reforms is how to engender 
healthy competition in addition to enhancing investments.  This demands the need to evolve an 
investment friendly interest rate regime that is supportive of the growth objective of the 
government.  The only way this can happen given the recapitalization schemes, is to allow 
increases in money supplies to be reflected in the costs of borrowing.  The lower costs of 
borrowing would induce the desired credit expansion, which would give fillip to investment 
activities.  Although this may be inflationary in the short run, it is still more beneficial since its 
origin is not from high powered money.  
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